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Picking Up the Seven-Ten Split by Pinning Down
the Reasonableness of Reassignment After
Barnett
Jared Hager*
Over the past four decades, Congress has attempted to
redress past societal discrimination and promote equal
employment opportunities by targeting the workplace with
various statutes that protect certain classes of individuals from
discrimination.1  To ensure equal treatment, these laws
generally prevent an employer from taking adverse
employment actions against an individual because of his
membership in a protected class.2  The Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) is unique because its nondiscrimination
mandate requires that an employer treat disabled individuals
differently, arguably preferentially, 3 by attaching liability to an
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000,
Lewis and Clark College, Portland, OR. The author would like to thank
Professors Stephen F. Befort and Miranda McGowan for their helpful
guidance and advice. Rebecca Bernhard, Jennifer L.M. Jacobs, and the
Editors of the Minnesota Law Review provided invaluable comments and
suggestions integral to this Note's development. Finally, thanks to my family
and friends; without your love and support, none of this would be.
1. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17
(2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); see
also id. § 12101(a)(7)-(8) (finding that "individuals with disabilities.., have
been... subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment," and that the
"proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity").
2. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual ... ."); id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.... ").
3. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521 (2002) ("By
definition any special 'accommodation' requires the employer to treat an
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employer's failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations" of its qualified
employees or applicants, unless the employer can prove "that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business."4 Even more extraordinary is the
accommodation of "last resort": reassignment to a vacant
position. 5 Instead of excusing or altering a disabled worker's
job performance, this controversial accommodation mandates
that an employer transfer the worker to an entirely different
position. 6 Reassignment raises special issues when it conflicts
with neutral policies to fill vacancies in a certain manner.
The Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal are
divided on the question of whether an employer must reassign
a qualified disabled employee7 to a vacant position when such
employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially."); see also S.
Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 618-26 (2001)
(distinguishing Title VII's equal treatment approach to nondiscrimination
from the ADA's different treatment approach, as characterized by the
requirement of reasonable accommodation). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer.., to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist .... "), with id. §
12112(b)(5)(B) (construing the term "discriminate" to include the failure to
make reasonable accommodations to the disabilities of qualified individuals).
But see Thomas F. O'Neil III & Kenneth M. Reiss, Reassigning Disabled
Employees Under the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of Equality?, 17 LAB.
LAw. 347, 349 (2001) (concluding from the ADA's legislative history that the
ADA should not mandate judicial preferences for the disabled over the non-
disabled).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
5. See id. § 12111(9)(B).
6. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neutral" Employer Policies and the ADA:
The Implication of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002) (noting that reassignment is one the most
controversial provisions of the ADA); Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult
ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 448 (2002).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual as a person
"who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires");
see also Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir.
2000) (applying the definition of qualified individual to the context of
reassignment). A plaintiff must prove that he is qualified as part of his prima
facie case. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring reasonable
accommodation only for qualified disabled employees or applicants). For a
more thorough overview of a disabled worker's prima facie case, see Stephen
F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
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reassignment would violate its neutral policy of filling
vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. 8 The stakes are
high. If the disabled employee prevails in his reassignment
request over the better-qualified applicant, then the ADA
would mandate what Seventh Circuit's former Chief Judge
Richard Posner called "affirmative action with a vengeance."9
The ADA would require an employer to fill a vacancy with a
less-qualified disabled worker even though the employer would
prefer, and indeed has a standing policy, to hire the best-
qualified candidate for the position.' 0 The question is one of
reasonableness, which is unanswered by the statute,"I and of
policy, which divides legal scholars as well as the circuits. 12
In US Airways v. Barnett,13 decided in April 2002, the
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of "reasonable
accommodation" for the first time in the statute's twelve-year
history.' 4 The Court held that reassignment constitutes an
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability
Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 33-37 (1999).
8. Compare Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165, 1169
(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that reassignment to a vacant position
requires more than just allowing a disabled employee to compete equally with
other applicants, and that requiring the disabled worker to "be the best
qualified employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss unwarranted by the
statutory language or its legislative history"), with EEOC v. Humiston-
Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the ADA does
not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee" to a vacant position
when there is a more qualified applicant and "provided that it's the employer's
consistent ... policy to hire the best applicant for the particular job").
9. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029.
10. See id.
11. O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 3, at 349 (observing that the statute
provides no guidance whatsoever in determining whether a certain
accommodation is reasonable).
12. Compare Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation,
Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1086-90 (2000)
(finding that the relative losses of denying transfer support the disabled
worker's right to reassignment over a better-qualified employee or outside
applicant), with O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 3, at 348 (concluding that the ADA
"should not mandate judicial preferences for the disabled over the non-
disabled" because it would undermine legitimate business interests, such as
competing effectively).
13. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
14. Id. at 1520-23; see Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein,
Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 362
(2002); Leading Cases-Federal Statutes and Regulations-Americans with
Disabilities Act, 116 HARv. L. REV. 342, 347 (2002) [hereinafter Leading
Cases].
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unreasonable accommodation, regardless of proof of undue
hardship, when it conflicts with a bona fide nondiscriminatory
seniority system. 15 Even though the Court did not resolve the
circuit split over best-qualified applicant rules, 16 four different
interpretations of the reasonableness of reassignment with
respect to neutral employer policies emerged from Barnett,17
which informs the proper resolution of the seven-ten split. 18
Although legal scholars have commented on the competing
policy concerns surrounding reassignment in violation of best-
qualified applicant policies,' 9 no one has yet to address or
incorporate Barnett's impact on this specific issue. In addition,
discussions of Barnett have focused on the general inquiry of
reassignment versus neutral workplace rules as a normative
matter; these critique the opinion rather than apply its
reasoning to a specific neutral policy. 20
This Note seeks to resolve the seven-ten split by
identifying and applying the different concepts of reasonable
accommodation that emerged from Barnett to a transfer
request that violates an employer's neutral policy to fill
vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. Part I briefly
outlines the relevant mandates of the ADA, including Equal
15. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1519-24.
16. See id. at 1519 (limiting the holding to the specific facts of the case
and deciding solely the reasonableness of reassignment when it conflicts with
the rules of a seniority system).
17. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 2 (noting the "fractured" nature of the
Court's resolution of Barnett).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See supra notes 6, 12; see also John E. Murray & Christopher J.
Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV.
721, 731-42 (2000) (arguing that considerations of fairness, administrative
efficiency, and statutory interpretation support a disabled individual's right to
reassignment despite a policy to transfer the most qualified employee);
Matthew B. Robinson, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation vs. Seniority in
the Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
179, 213-15 (2003) (concluding that Barnett is wrong and that employers
should have to prove that subjecting seniority rules to reassignment would
cause an undue hardship).
20. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at 362-69 (assessing the
relative strengths of the majority's approach vis-A-vis Justice Scalia's
alternative interpretation with respect to the normative impulse behind the
ADA); Anderson, supra note 6, at 2-4 (examining Barnett's impact on neutral
employer policies generally and concluding that the case was incorrectly
decided because the right to reassignment should always trump a neutral
policy unless the employer can prove an undue hardship); Leading Cases,
supra note 14, at 351-52 (criticizing Barnett's reliance on analogical reasoning
to interpret provisions unique to the ADA).
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations
promulgated to implement the statute. Part II describes the
current circuit split by summarizing the seminal cases in the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits. Part III reviews the divergent
Supreme Court interpretations of the reasonableness of
reassignment as an accommodation when it violates neutral
seniority rules. Part IV identifies the common ground in
Barnett's differing visions of reasonable accommodation and
applies it to the context of a reassignment that conflicts with a
neutral policy of filling vacancies with the best-qualified
applicant.
This Note argues that, pursuant to the interpretations
emerging from Barnett, reassignment is reasonable even when
it conflicts with a neutral best-qualified applicant policy.21 The
Note concludes by predicting a seven-two Supreme Court
decision in favor of an employee's statutory right to
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, unless the
employer can prove the existence of an undue hardship.
Congress intended for disabled individuals to be treated
differently than their able-bodied counterparts, and Barnett
has laid the groundwork for sanctioning, indeed mandating,
preferences for disabled workers in the context of
reassignment.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE RELEVANT
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Congress passed the ADA with overwhelming bipartisan
support in 1990.22 The statute mandates that employers make
reasonable accommodations to enable qualified disabled
workers to participate fully and fairly in the workplace. 23 The
21. An employer would still be able to prove that not hiring the best-
qualified applicant, pursuant to its policy, would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text
(discussing the distinct burdens of proving reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship).
22. The House passed the ADA by a vote of 403-20, 136 CONG. REC. S9686
(daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin), and the Senate by a 76-8
vote, 135 CONG. REC. S16102 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000) (mandating that employers make
reasonable accommodations); see also id. § 12101(a)(8) (noting that "the
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals"); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18-19 (1989);
Signing Statement of President Bush, PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990),
2003] 2067
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statute includes "reassignment to a vacant position" within its
definition of reasonable accommodation. 24 Recognizing that
past discrimination was largely driven by employers' economic
motives, 25 the ADA allows a cost-based defense in cases of
reasonable accommodation: undue hardship.26
A. THE ADA'S GENERAL RULE
The ADA's employment discrimination provision mandates
that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the [individual's]
disability... [with] regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."27  Only employer acts that
"discriminate" are subject to liability.28 Congress constructed
the term to include multiple employment decisions. 29 For
example, "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects [her] opportunities or
status" because of her disability is an act that discriminates. 30
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602 (suggesting that the ADA would bring
people with disabilities into the "mainstream of American life").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
25. The disadvantages faced by disabled workers are not generally the
result of invidious discrimination, but rather legitimate economic concerns of
employers-although these may be driven in part by negative stereotypes
concerning the productivity of disabled workers. See Amar & Brownstein,
supra note 14, at 368 (arguing that Congress must have intended to increase
the number of disabled individuals in the workplace at the expense of
employers because most discrimination against the disabled was the product
of economic rationality); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001) (suggesting that employers may have completely
rational reasons to deny accommodations to disabled individuals).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) ("[Tihe term 'discriminate' includes ... not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business ... .
27. Id. § 12112(a).
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2002) ("It is unlawful for a covered entity to
discriminate on the basis of disability against a qualified individual with a
disability .... ).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (labeling the subsection "Construction,"
Congress said "[a]s used in subsection (a) of this section, the term
'discriminate' includes. ..").
30. Id. § 12112(b)(1). The statute also extends protection to those who
associate with disabled individuals by constructing the term "discriminate" to
2068
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More significantly, failing to reasonably accommodate a
disabled employee constitutes discrimination because of
disability.31
B. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
The ADA prevents an employer from "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity. '32 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
availability of a reasonable accommodation as part of her prima
facie case of discrimination. 33
The ADA defines reasonable accommodation to include
changes in the job application process, 34 alterations to the work
environment or the customary methods of job performance, 35
and modifications that allow an individual with a disability to
enjoy the same benefits and privileges of employment that
similarly situated, non-disabled employees enjoy.36 Ultimately,
mean "excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified
individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." Id.
§ 12112(b)(4).
31. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (declaring that it is
"unlawful for a covered entity not to make reasonable accommodation to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or
employee with a disability"); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d
1154, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("The unvarnished obligation derived
from the statute is this: an employer discriminates against a qualified
individual with a disability if the employer fails to offer a reasonable
accommodation.").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
33. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002). In a
claim of discrimination because of the failure to provide reasonable
accommodation, the plaintiff must prove that she has a disability as defined
by the ADA, is a qualified individual under the Act, the employer was aware of
the disability, and the employer failed to provide her with a reasonable
accommodation. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281,
1284-85 (7th Cir. 1996).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i). These types of modifications enable
consideration of a disabled applicant. Id.
35. Id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). These types of modifications enable a disabled
individual to perform the essential job functions. Id.
36. Id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). Reassignment is this kind of modification since
it is not available to applicants, see infra note 45, and requires transfer of the
disabled worker to an entirely different position, as opposed to enabling
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the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate depends on the
extent of the limit imposed by the requirement that the
accommodation be reasonable, 37 and whether the employer can,
or must, prove undue hardship-a specific defense for failing to
accommodate. 38
C. REASSIGNMENT AS A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The ADA lists reassignment to a vacant position as a
possible form of accommodation. 39 Reassignment to a vacant
position requires much more than the mere modification of
workplace structures or job duties; it forces an employer to
transfer his disabled employee to a different position. 40 The
EEOC has issued a number of guidelines for construing the
ADA's provisions. 41 These guidelines do not have "the force of
performance of the current job. See supra text accompanying note 6.
37. This Note answers this question relying on the four interpretive
frameworks provided in Barnett's fractured decision. See infra notes 61-63
and accompanying text (providing an overview); infra Part III (discussing the
four interpretations); infra Part IV (applying the interpretations to a
reassignment that contravenes a best-qualified hiring rule).
38. See infra Part I.D; infra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). Specifically, Congress said that "[t]he
term 'reasonable accommodation' may include.., reassignment to a vacant
position .... " Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if reassignment successfully allows
a qualified disabled employee to remain employed, then an employer might
have to so accommodate. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345. A plaintiff, however, must show
more than just the existence of an effective accommodation; the
accommodation also must be reasonable. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S.
Ct. 1516, 1522-23 (2002) (distinguishing the plaintiffs burden of proving an
accommodation that is both effective and reasonable).
40. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1054.
41. These guidelines include an appendix to the formally codified
regulations in the C.F.R. titled Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2002) [hereinafter
Interpretive Guidance], an assistance manual on the employment provisions of
the ADA, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu/links/
ADAtaml.html (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL],
and an EEOC compliance manual on reasonable accommodation and the
undue hardship defense, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html (last modified Jan. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]. For a thorough overview of these
interpretive guidelines, see Befort, supra note 6, at 450-51.
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law" and are not entitled to "special deference."4 2 In practice,
however, because the statute authorized the EEOC to issue
regulations to implement the ADA, courts often defer to the
Interpretive Guidance since it construes the agency's own
regulations.4 3
With respect to reassignment, these guidelines set forth
several general limits on the employer's duty to transfer a
disabled employee. First, an employer should consider
reassignment as a last resort, only when there is no other
effective accommodation or when all accommodations within
the individual's current position would pose an undue
hardship.44 Second, reassignment is only available to existing
employees. 45 Third, an employer should attempt to reassign
the disabled individual to an equivalent position.4 6 Fourth, the
42. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999).
43. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 n.5 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (stating that courts must give substantial deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations; indeed "the agency's
interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulations" (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994))); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (authorizing the
EEOC to promulgate regulations to implement the ADA).
44. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 41 ("Reassignment is the
reasonable accommodation of last resort and is required only after it has been
determined that: (1) there are no effective accommodations that will enable
the employee to perform the essential functions of his/her current position, or
(2) all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship."
(citing Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o); S. REP. NO. 101-116,
at 34 (1989); H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990))). Thus, reassignment is
the last chance for a disabled individual to remain employed; if reassignment
is not appropriate (i.e., causes an undue hardship, or is unreasonable), then
the disabled employee is not qualified and is unprotected from an adverse
employment decision by the statute. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(m).
45. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) ("Reassignment
is not available to applicants.").
46. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 41 ("Reassignment
should be made to a position equivalent to the one presently held in terms of
pay and other job status .... ). Reassignment does not require the promotion
of a disabled employee. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)
("It should also be noted that an employer is not required to promote an
individual with a disability as an accommodation." (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116,
at 31-32 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990))); see also
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 41 ("Reassignment does not include
giving an employee a promotion. Thus, an employee must compete for any
vacant position that would constitute a promotion."). An employer may
reassign an individual to a lower graded position, however, if there are no
vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified. See
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
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guidelines echo the language of the statute by declaring that
the duty to reassign an employee only exists if there is a vacant
position 7 for which the disabled employee is qualified.4
8
Finally, an employer is not obligated to reassign a disabled
employee if the reassignment would impose an undue hardship
on the business. 49
D. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DEFENSE
The ADA balances employers' bottom-line interests with
the broad societal goal of ensuring employment for persons
with disabilities.50 Accordingly, the employer is not liable for
failing to make reasonable accommodations if it shows that
such accommodation will impose an undue hardship.51 The
ADA defines undue hardship as "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense."52 The statute lists multiple factors to
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (indicating that reassignment may be a
reasonable accommodation if it is to a vacant position). An employer is not
required to create a new job or to bump another employee from a job to
reassign. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 41; see also
Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 169 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the
ADA does not require the creation of a new position to accommodate a
disabled employee).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring reasonable accommodation
only for qualified individuals); supra note 7 (noting the ADA's definition of
qualified individual). An employee is qualified if he or she satisfies the
requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of
the position and can perform the essential functions of the new position with
or without reasonable accommodation. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(m) (laying out two-step process to determine if a disabled
individual is qualified).
49. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (noting that
proof of undue hardship relieves the employer's obligation to provide an
accommodation); see also infra Part I.D (laying out the undue hardship
defense).
50. The ADA mandates non-discrimination through various burdens and
limitations on employer action, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b); see supra Part I.A, yet
allows a cost-based defense in cases of reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). For a more thorough overview and critical perspective of the
ADA's effectiveness in balancing these interests, see generally Sue A. Krenek,
Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969 (1994).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837,
837 (7th Cir. 2001). Other defenses shield an employer from ADA liability,
such as the direct threat defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b). These,
however, are largely irrelevant in answering the question of whether an
employer can fill a vacant position with a best-qualified applicant instead of a
qualified disabled employee seeking reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (defining undue hardship as "an action
2072
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guide a court in determining whether a proposed reasonable
accommodation imposes an undue hardship-all of which are
economic or financial in nature and concern the operation of
the business as a whole.53 The inquiry into whether an undue
hardship exists is fact intensive. 54 Thus, an accommodation
that poses an undue hardship for one employer at a particular
time may not pose an undue hardship for another employer, or
even for the same employer at another time; the result depends
on the facts of the specific case.55
As an affirmative defense, the burden of proving undue
hardship is on the defendant. 56 This burden requires more
than showing a de minimis cost to the employer, Title VII's
standard of undue hardship,57 because Congress was aware
that most accommodations impose some economic burden.58 To
ensure the "full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency" of disabled individuals, 59 the ADA places the
requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of various
economic factors).
53. Id. The relevant factors are the following:
[t]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
chapter; the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses
and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility; the overall financial resources of the
covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with
respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location
of its facilities; and the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative,
or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity.
Id. § 12111(10)(B).
54. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p).
55. Id.
56. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1523 (2002). A plaintiff
must prove the existence of an effective and reasonable accommodation before
the employer has any obligation to prove an undue hardship on the business.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text; discussion accompanying infra
notes 122-24.
57. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989) (rejecting Hardison's de minimis
standard of undue hardship in light of the ADA's purposes); H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350; Anderson, supra
note 6, at 29; Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 349-50; see also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (interpreting the religious
accommodation provisions of Title VII to require no more than de minimis cost
to the employer).
58. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
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costs of accommodation on the employer, unless those costs are
shown to be significantly difficult in light of the economic
fortitude of the particular business. 60
II. THE SEVEN-TEN SPLIT: COMPETING JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
REASONABLENESS OF REASSIGNMENT
Congress defined reasonable accommodation in a list of
permissive, rather than mandatory, accommodations. 61
Nothing in the text, therefore, supports an absolute obligation
to reassign a qualified disabled employee. 62 The threshold
question is whether the proposed accommodation is
reasonable.63  Recently, courts have interpreted the
reasonableness of reassignment, albeit in an uncertain
manner.64 Specifically, courts have addressed whether an
employer must reassign a qualified disabled employee to a
vacant position when such reassignment would violate a
neutral policy, such as an established seniority system 65 or
60. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at 368; see also supra notes
52-54 and accompanying text (noting the individualized factors that determine
whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship); cf. EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (conceding that
"[iut is true that antidiscrimination statutes impose costs on employers").
61. See supra note 39 ("The term 'reasonable accommodation' may
include ... reassignment to a vacant position .... ).
62. The contingent right to reassignment contrasts with the absolute right
to reasonable accommodations absent undue hardship. See supra notes 32, 39
and accompanying text.
63. After a plaintiff has proven the existence of a reasonable
accommodation, a defendant must either implement the proposed
accommodation or prove the existence of an affirmative defense, such as an
undue hardship. Supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
33, 56 and accompanying text (distinguishing burdens of the plaintiff and
defendant in an ADA case).
64. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1519-20 (2002)
(interpreting the reasonableness of reassignment when it conflicts with an
employer's disability-neutral seniority system); Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at
1028-29 (exempting an employer from the ADA's reassignment provision if the
disabled employee is "inferior" to other applicants and it is "the employer's
consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant" rather than the first);
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (holding that, if appropriate, the disabled employee has a right in fact to
a transfer since reassignment means more than allowing an employee to apply
for a job on the same basis as anybody else).
65. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1520 (stating the question facing the Court
in the petition for certiorari).
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filling vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. 66 While the
Court answered the former issue,67 the latter remains open and
divides the Seventh and Tenth Circuits.68
A. THE TEN PIN: SMITH V. MIDLAND BRAKE69
Robert Smith assembled and tested air brake valves for
nearly seven years before developing muscular injuries and
chronic dermatitis from on-the-job contact with various
chemicals, rendering him unfit to work in his position. 70 His
employer eventually fired him because no accommodation
would allow him to perform his job. 71 The Tenth Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc to decide the scope of the
employer's reassignment obligation. 72 Specifically, the court
addressed whether an employer must reassign a disabled
worker when other, more qualified applicants seek a vacant
position.73
The court rejected the argument that the duty to reassign
merely means that an employer must consider a disabled
employee's request to transfer to a vacant position along with
all other applications the employer receives from coworkers and
outside job applicants.74 The court found that the ADA's literal
language indicated that Congress intended reassignment to
provide "something more" than the mere opportunity to apply
for a job with the rest of the world. 75 Like all the other listed
66. See supra note 64 (noting the decisions of the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits); discussion infra Part II.A-B.
67. See discussion infra Part III.
68. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
70. Id. at 1160.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1159.
73. See id. at 1175-76.
74. See id. at 1164. The court noted that the reassignment provision
would be redundant if it meant only consideration on an equal basis with all
other applicants because the ADA already prohibits discrimination in
application proceedings. See id. at 1164-65; supra note 30 and accompanying
text (observing that the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in
the job application process).
75. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164. The court observed that the
ADA does not define reasonable accommodation as including "consideration of
a reassignment to a vacant position," but rather "reassignment to a vacant
position," making the active verb "reassign," not "consider." Id. In addition,
the court found the core word "assign" implies some active effort on the part of
the employer. See id. (citing Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
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accommodations, an employer must consider reassignment to a
vacant position, and if appropriate, the employer must also
offer the reassignment.7 6
The court noted that its vision of reassignment did not
unduly burden or disrupt employers' prerogative because
Congress significantly cabined the obligation to grant a
reassignment request through other means. 77 The ADA only
requires employers to reassign their disabled workers when
there is an equivalent position that is vacant.78 In addition, the
employee must be qualified for the vacant position.7 9 Finally,
reassignment is never required if it is unreasonable or imposes
undue hardship.80
The court observed that the right to reassignment is not
absolute; even if effective, the word "reasonable" provided an
intrinsic limit to reassignment as an accommodation. 8 The
court determined that the ADA does not require reassignment
in favor of a disabled employee when it constitutes a
fundamental and unreasonable alteration in the nature of an
employer's business.8 2 While the Tenth Circuit did not list all
employer policies that may be so fundamental to its business as
to render reassignment unreasonable,8 3 it did establish a
76. See id. at 1167.
77. See id. at 1170. The court cited to the various limits imposed by
EEOC regulations, such as relegating reassignment to the status of a "last
resort" accommodation. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text
(outlining the limits on reassignment imposed by EEOC regulations).
78. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170. The position is not considered
vacant, however, if another employee has a legitimate contractual or seniority
right to it. See id. Here the Tenth Circuit seems to mirror the Supreme
Court's analysis in Barnett as well as Justice O'Connor's concurrence. See
discussion infra Part III (discussing the position of the Barnett majority with
respect to seniority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence with respect to
enforceable contractual rights). The ADA's reassignment provision does not
require the creation of a new position or promotion. See supra notes 46-47.
79. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170; supra note 48 and
accompanying text (relaying the EEOC's similar interpretation). The court
recognized that reassignment need not involve a promotion of the disabled
employee. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170. This means that vacant
positions are limited to those of equivalent or lower status as the job held by
the disabled worker. See supra note 46.
80. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170.
81. See id. at 1175.
82. Id. at 1176. The court recited the example of a well-entrenched
seniority system. See id. (noting that seniority establishes legitimate
employee expectations).
83. See id. ("We neither attempt here to itemize all such policies that may
exist nor comment upon such policies which may be so fundamental to the way
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framework.8 4 Legitimate and nondiscriminatory policies would
be subordinate to an employer's reassignment obligation under
the ADA when to do otherwise would "essentially vitiate" the
employer's express statutory obligation to employ reassignment
as a form of reasonable accommodation. 85 The court recited the
obvious example of an employer's policy against ever reas-
signing its employees. 86
B. THE SEVEN PIN: EEOC V. HUMISTON-KEELING87
Nancy Houser, a picker in a warehouse, suffered an on-the-
job injury that left her unable to perform the essential function
of her job: frequently lifting items weighing as much as five
pounds off a conveyor belt.8 8 Houser's employer unsuccessfully
attempted several forms of reasonable accommodation to allow
her to continue working in her position.89 The company had
several vacant clerical and telemarketing positions, and Houser
met the qualification standards.90 She applied for a variety of
different positions that would allow her to continue working
despite her disability, but each time, pursuant to its bona fide
policy to give vacant jobs to the best applicant,91 the company
rejected her in favor of another, more qualified candidate.92
Since no accommodation could allow her to perform her job and
there was no vacant position for which she was most qualified,
Houser was fired.93
The Seventh Circuit rejected the EEOC's interpretation of
the ADA's reassignment provision as requiring the transfer of a
qualified disabled person over a more qualified non-disabled
an employer does business that it would be unreasonable to set aside [the
policy in favor of reassignment].").
84. See id.
85. Id.; see also Befort, supra note 6, at 470 (advocating the Tenth
Circuit's standard that employers do not have to make an exception for facially
neutral policies unless the policy would "essentially vitiate" the obligation
under the ADA to reassign qualified disabled workers).
86. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1176 ("Such a policy, if allowed to trump
the ADA, would read out of the act the provision that reassignment is one of
the appropriate reasonable accommodations.").
87. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 1026.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1026-27.
92. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 798, 805 (N.D.
Ill. 1999), affd, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
93. See Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1026-27.
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applicant.94 The court reasoned that Houser's disability had
nothing to do with the clerical positions she sought, and
therefore, granting her the reassignment in favor of a better-
qualified applicant would amount to "bonus points to people
with disabilities."95  The court held that an employer's
consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant for the
particular job, rather than the first qualified applicant,
dispenses the statutory obligation to reassign. 96
The court recognized that Midland Brake was factually
indistinguishable, but found the Tenth Circuit's decision was
incompatible with Seventh Circuit precedent holding that the
ADA is not a mandatory preference act. 97 Thus, in the Seventh
Circuit, an employer's nondiscriminatory policy to fill vacancies
with the best-qualified applicant trumps a disabled employee's
right to reasonable accommodation regardless of a showing of
undue hardship.98
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST ROLL AT
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
US AIRWAYS V. BARNETT 9
Congress outlawed an employer's failure to reassign a
disabled employee by prohibiting discrimination because of
disability,' 00 constructing the term "discriminate" to include the
failure to make reasonable accommodations to the known
disabilities of qualified employees 0 1 and defining reassignment
94. See id. at 1027. The EEOC maintained that the scope of an
employer's reassignment obligation is specifically limited by the factors set
forth in its guidelines. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. The
Enforcement Guidance is unambiguous. A disabled employee "does not need
to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to obtain it as a
reassignment." ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 41.
95. See Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.
96. See id. at 1029.
97. Id. at 1028.
98. The court was concerned that a "contrary... result.., would be both
inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable
imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees." Id. (citing
Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998)).
99. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
100. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (setting out the ADA's
general prohibition).
101. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (highlighting Congress's
construction of the ADA's general prohibition on discrimination); see also
supra note 7 (discussing the prima facie element of being qualified as meaning
able to perform the essential job functions of the position held or desired).
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as a type of reasonable accommodation. 10 2 While the statute is
clear in requiring accommodations that are reasonable 0 3 and
do not cause an undue hardship, 10 4 it remains silent as to what
is or is not reasonable. 0 5 In Barnett, the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the meaning of this limitation for the first
time. 10 6 The case, however, resulted in a five-four decision,
with five separate opinions, and was limited to the issue of
seniority. 107  More importantly, four interpretations of
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation emerged from
the case. 08  Therefore, examining each opinion and
understanding the differing views of reasonableness,
reassignment, and the importance attached to neutral
workplace rules, is essential in assessing whether best-
qualified hiring rules trump the ADA's right to
reassignment. 0 9
Robert Barnett injured his back on the job and invoked his
102. See supra note 39 (listing "reassignment to a vacant position" as one
method of reasonable accommodation).
103. See supra notes 39, 61-63 and accompanying text (noting that the
permissive use of "may" within the statutorily defined types of accommodation
suggests that the accommodation must be reasonable, not just effective).
104. See discussion supra Part I.D.
105. See O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 3, at 349 ("The statute identifies
factors that are relevant to an undue hardship analysis, yet it provides no
guidance whatsoever in determining whether a certain accommodation is
reasonable.").
106. See supra text accompanying note 14; infra note 123 and
accompanying text (examining the Court's interpretation of the word
"reasonable").
107. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1518 (2002).
108. See id. at 1519, 1526, 1528, 1532. Justice Stevens authored a
concurrence agreeing with the majority's interpretation of reasonable
accommodation and the effect of a seniority system on the reassignment
provision, see id. at 1525-26 (Stevens, J., concurring), while highlighting a
plaintiffs method of proving that an ordinarily unreasonable accommodation
is reasonable in a particular situation. See id. Justice Stevens believed that
the impact on fellow employees, the existence of a legal entitlement to the
position, and prior deviations from the seniority system would be significant in
overcoming a presumption of unreasonableness. Id. at 1526. Since Justice
Stevens's concurrence does not offer an independent interpretation of
reasonable accommodation, this Note omits analysis of his opinion.
109. While it is clear that Justices may change their mind on a given issue,
see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 n.1 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("While I joined the Court's opinion in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., I
have lived to regret it; and I would now correct what I believe to be its
fundamental error." (citations omitted)), lower courts will decide similar ADA
issues in accordance with Barnett. See infra note 155 (discussing the legal
effect a Supreme Court interpretation of a statute has on lower courts).
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seniority rights to transfer to a less physically demanding
mailroom position."10  The company's policy, however,
periodically opened the position to seniority-based bidding, and
when two senior employees bid for the spot, Barnett lost his
job.' Barnett sued, claiming US Airways violated the ADA by
refusing to assign him permanently to the mailroom position as
a reasonable accommodation." 2 The Court considered whether
Barnett's reassignment was reasonable even though it would
contravene the employer's standing seniority system.' 13
A. THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, rejected the
defendant's view that the ADA prohibits all forms of
preferential treatment of disabled workers. 14 The Court noted
that any form of special accommodation requires that an
employer provide differential, and hence preferential,
treatment of disabled individuals. 115 The Court found that
Congress did not intend to grant neutral workplace rules an
automatic exemption from the ADA's mandate of reasonable
accommodation." 16 The fact that an accommodation permits a
disabled worker to violate neutral rules that others must obey,
the majority concluded, does not make it unreasonable. 17
The Court, however, also rejected the plaintiffs argument
that reasonable accommodation means effective accom-
modation.118  Utilizing the ordinary English meaning,119 the
statute's primary purposes, 120 and legislative guidance, 121 the




114. See id. at 1520-21.
115. Id. at 1521. The Court extended this analysis to explicitly reject
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. See id.
116. Id. ("[Congress] said nothing suggesting that the presence of...
neutral rules would create an automatic exemption.").
117. See id. ("The simple fact that an accommodation would provide a
'preference'--in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to
violate a rule that others must obey-cannot, in and of itself, automatically
show that the accommodation is not 'reasonable."').
118. See id. at 1522-23.
119. See id. The Court noted that "in ordinary English the word
'reasonable' does not mean 'effective.' It is the word 'accommodation,' not the
word 'reasonable,' that conveys the need for effectiveness." Id. at 1522.
120. See id. at 1522-23. The Court noted that the removal of stereotypes
and hostility, in order to keep "those with disabilities ... participating fully in
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majority reconciled the separate burdens of proving reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship in a practical manner.' 22
A plaintiff must show that an accommodation seems reasonable
on its face. 23 The defendant may respond by showing special,
case-specific circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship
on the operation of the business. 124 A demand for an effective
accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its impact
not on business operations, but on fellow employees.' 25
Applying this framework to the facts of the case, the
majority held that when reassignment would violate the rules
of a seniority system, the accommodation is ordinarily
unreasonable. 126 The Court supported its conclusion with
several factors. First, the majority observed that analogous
case law under Title VII recognized the importance of
seniority. 127 Second, the Court noted the typical seniority
system provides important employee benefits by creating and
fulfilling expectations of fair, uniform treatment.' 28 Seniority
provisions limit unfairness in personnel decisions, which
ensures job security and encourages employees to invest in the
company. 129 Forcing employers to prove an undue hardship
the Nation's ... workplace," is the primary goal of the statute. See id. To
accomplish this goal, the majority interpreted the ADA as demanding
"reasonable responsive reaction on the part of employers and fellow workers
alike .... [The ADA] will sometimes require affirmative conduct to promote
entry of disabled people into the workforce." Id. at 1523.
121. See id. Specifically, the Court found that Congress distinguished the
terms "reasonable" and "effective," and cited EEOC regulations as support.
See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. The Barnett majority cited circuit court definitions of what is
reasonable. "[P]laintiff meets burden on reasonableness by showing that...
the accommodation will be feasible for the employer." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001)).
"[Pilaintiff satisfies 'burden of production' by showing 'plausible
accommodation."' Id. (emphasis added) (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch.
Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1522. The Court gave examples of such unreasonable
impacts as "dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee benefits to
which an employer... may be relatively indifferent." Id. This interpretation
distinguishes the employer's burden of proving undue hardship from the
employee's burden of proving the existence of a reasonable accommodation.
126. Id. at 1523-24.
127. See id. at 1524 (recognizing the importance of seniority to employee-
management relations).
128. Id.
129. See id. (finding that seniority rules offer "an opportunity for steady
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resulting from violating a seniority system on a case-by-case
basis would undermine employees' expectations of consistent,
uniform treatment upon which the system's benefits depend. 130
Therefore, if reassignment violates standing seniority rules, it
is presumed unreasonable. 131
Even if a requested accommodation is unreasonable, the
plaintiff may show that special circumstances based on the
particular facts of the case overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness. 132 The main inquiry is whether special
circumstances alter the important expectations described
above; if so, then the accommodation will be reasonable, despite
the existence of a neutral seniority system. 133
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's interpretation
of the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision, 134 but sided
with the majority because she thought it was more important
that stalemate not prevail in cases merely interpreting a
statute. 35 Furthermore, she observed that the Court's rule
would often lead to the same outcome as the test she would
have adopted. 136
Justice O'Connor stated that the effect of a seniority
system on the reasonableness of a reassignment request
depends on the legal enforceability of the system. 137 In her
opinion, the relevant issue was whether the seniority rules
and predictable advancement based on objective standards," benefiting both
employee and employer).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1523-24 ("[I]t would not be reasonable in the run of cases that
the assignment in question trump the rules of a seniority system. To the
contrary, it will ordinarily be unreasonable for the assignment to prevail.").
132. Id. at 1525.
133. See id.
134. Justice O'Connor was troubled with the Court's blurring of the terms
"reasonable accommodation," a general inquiry, and "undue hardship," a
specific inquiry. Id. at 1528 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court blurred
these burdens by allowing a plaintiff to overcome a presumption of
unreasonableness. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id. (arguing that unenforceable seniority systems will likely allow
employers to "retai[n] the right to change the system," "permi[t] exceptions,"
and "reduc[e] employee expectations that the system will be followed" (quoting
id. at 1525)).
137. Id. at 1526.
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prevent the position from being vacant. 138 A position is not
vacant if a seniority system entitles an employee to fill it as
soon as it opens, nullifying any right a disabled employee would
have to reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. 139 To
state the converse proposition, a position is vacant if no other
employee either occupies or is legally entitled to it.140 Where
genuine vacancies exist, reassignment is reasonable and the
employer must prove an undue hardship in order to excuse the
failure to transfer its disabled worker.'14
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, focused on the
"because of' language of the ADA and argued that reasonable
accommodation requires only the suspension of rules and
practices that the employee's disability prevents him from
observing. 142 Justice Scalia noted that the ADA mandates
accommodation to the limitations of qualified disabled
employees. 43 Read together, these two provisions require the
plaintiff to prove that the employer did not remove barriers
that would not be barriers but for the employee's disability. 144
Justice Scalia's interpretation suggested that the right to
reassignment exists only if there are no obstacles to that
appointment, for example, a seniority system or a candidate
who is better qualified, if there is a policy to fill vacancies with
the best-qualified applicant. 45  This does not render the
reassignment provision moot, however, because a similarly
situated non-disabled, non-performing employee will typically
be fired whereas the ADA mandates that an employer first
138. See id. at 1527.
139. See id. An employer's obligation to reassign only occurs if the desired
position is vacant. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000); supra note 47 and
accompanying text (discussing the vacancy requirement).
140. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1527 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The word
'vacant' means 'not filled or occupied by an incumbent [or] possessor.' In the
context of a workplace, a vacant position is a position in which no employee
currently works and to which no individual has a legal entitlement." (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2527 (1976))).
141. See id. at 1527-28.
142. See id. at 1528-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 1529; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the duty to make
reasonable accommodations "to the known physical or mental limitations" of a
qualified disabled individual).
144. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 1530.
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consider reassigning a non-performing disabled employee to a
vacant position. 146 Justice Scalia interpreted reassignment as
only eliminating the obstacle of the current position when an
alternate position is freely available. 147 Justice Scalia's vision
of reassignment, however, did not require the elimination of
obstacles to an employee's transfer that have nothing to do with
his disability, such as another employee's claim to that position
under a seniority system, or another employee's superior
qualifications. 148
D. JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
examined the legislative history of the ADA specifically and
comparable anti-discrimination legislation more generally. 149
He would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision that a
unilaterally imposed seniority system enjoys no special
protection under the ADA. 150 Furthermore, Justice Souter
found that Barnett's reassignment was reasonable because US
Airways's specific seniority system was not binding and its
violation would not have a great impact on other employees. 15'
At this point, Justice Souter would shift the burden to the
146. See id. Justice Scalia suggests that "[sluch reassignment is an
accommodation to the disability because it removes an obstacle (the inability




149. See id. at 1532-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter pointed out
that because Congress meant for collective bargaining agreements to amount
to no more than "a factor" in deciding whether an accommodation that violates
a seniority system is reasonable, Congress surely meant for "no greater
weight" to be afforded "a seniority scheme ... unilaterally imposed by the
employer, and,... not singled out for protection by any positive federal
statute," than is afforded collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1533. The
legislative history also explicitly rejected the application of Title VII religious
accommodation principles of undue hardship analysis. See id. at 1533, 1534
n.2; supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
proving an undue hardship).
150. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. See id. Significant to Justice Souter was the fact that, unlike most
employees seeking accommodation, Barnett sought a continuation of the
status quo rather than a change of position. Id. This suggests that the impact
on other employees was not so great as the defendant suggested since the
reassignment would neither bump any other employee nor result in an
employee losing a job. Id. In addition, US Airways did not intend for its
seniority rules to be binding, so there could not have been any great disruption
of employee expectations by granting the reassignment request. Id.
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defendant-employer to prove that violating the seniority system
would cause an undue hardship on its operations. 152
IV. PICKING UP THE SEVEN-TEN SPLIT: BARNETT
SPARES THE ADA'S RIGHT TO REASSIGNMENT
Whether a qualified disabled employee is entitled to
reassignment when it would violate a standing employer policy
to fill vacancies with the best-qualified applicant depends on
the meaning of "reasonable accommodation." A statute's text is
the most authoritative interpretive tool, 153 but the ADA is
silent as to what "reasonable" means.1 54 The four strains of
thought emerging from Barnett, however, provide a framework
to determine .when reassignment will be unreasonable because
the Court's interpretation of a statute is binding on lower
courts. 55 To better frame the discussion, this Part will initially
discuss the common ground among the Justices' varying
interpretations of reasonable accommodation, most notably
their shared focus on the impact on fellow employees that
results from breaching the employer's neutral policy.
When an employer is forced to violate its neutral policy to
fill vacancies with the best-qualified applicant by reassigning a
less-qualified disabled worker, the employer bypasses either an
152. Id.
153. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990) ("The
text is most often the starting point for interpretation, and textual arguments
carry the greatest argumentative weight."). Eskridge and Frickey also provide
a useful overview of the competing theories of statutory interpretation. See id.
at 325-45 (discussing intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism).
154. See supra Part I.B (recognizing an employer's obligation to make
reasonable accommodations, listing several types of accommodations, but
failing to define what makes the accommodations reasonable).
155. The Supreme Court, in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., stated,
It is this Court's responsibility to say what a statute means, and once
the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that
understanding of the governing rule of law. A judicial construction of
a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant
before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that
construction.
511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)
(per curiam) (stating that "unless we wish anarchy to prevail" within the
federal judicial system, "a precedent of this Court must be followed by the
lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may
think it to be"). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some
Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. &
RELIGION 33, 77-78 (1989) (arguing that lower court judges may not be bound
to enforce higher court precedent).
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external applicant or internal, transfer-seeking coworker. 156
Three of the four Barnett opinions this Note examines,
accounting for seven Justices, substantially relied on the
impact that such an accommodation might have on other
employees, and it is this differential impact that determines
whether reassignment is reasonable. 157  Therefore, after
identifying Barnett's common ground, this Part concludes with
a separate discussion of the two possible scenarios.
A. PINNING DOWN THE REASONABLENESS OF REASSIGNMENT:
BARNETT'S COMMON GROUND
Barnett interpreted "reasonable accommodation" and its
reassignment provision solely with respect to seniority
systems. 158  The reasoning within the Justices' opinions,
however, provides a basis for understanding the scope of the
ADA's accommodation mandate with respect to other neutral
workplace rules. 159  The Court's general conception of
reasonable accommodation seems to reject the Seventh
Circuit's stance against a disabled worker's right to a
reassignment that conflicts with her employer's policy to fill
vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. 160  Even post-
Barnett, however, the Seventh Circuit has remained steadfast
in its protection of best-qualified applicant rules: Reassignment
is reasonable only if it is feasible and does not require the
employer to turn away a superior applicant.' 6' Thus, in the
156. See, e.g., Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1086-90 (discussing
arguments in favor of choosing the disabled worker).
157. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (noting the majority's
position that an accommodation's detrimental effects on other employees can
make it unreasonable and the general agreement on this point in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Souter's dissent). But see O'Neil & Reiss,
supra note 3, at 359 (suggesting that the ADA's legislative history "espouses
the view that an employer is entitled to hire the most qualified applicant for a
position... regardless of whether the individual is being selected from outside
the company or from within").
158. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
159. Supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Anderson, supra note
6, at 2-3 (addressing the implications of Barnett beyond the specific context of
seniority systems).
160. Compare US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1521 (2002)
(recognizing that all accommodations require preferential treatment), with
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-29 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that the existence of a neutral policy trumps the right to
reassignment because the ADA is not a mandatory preference act).
161. Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2002). The court summed
up its interpretation of Barnett rather succinctly:
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Seventh Circuit, an employer does not have to prove that
violating its best-qualified hiring rules would impose an undue
hardship; reassignment in this instance is unreasonable per se,
because the contrary decision would grant individuals a
mandatory preference solely because of their membership in a
protected class. 162 Professor Cheryl Anderson likewise posits
that the ultimate impact of Barnett will be the creation of a
"neutral policy presumption" that forces plaintiffs to prove the
absence of undue hardship, 163 although she disagrees with this
[Aissuming that [the plaintiff! was qualified for such a job, if
nevertheless there were better-qualified applicants ... the VA did not
violate its duty of reasonable accommodation by giving the job to
them instead of to her. This conclusion is bolstered by [Barnett]
which holds that an employer is not required to give a disabled
employee superseniority to enable him to retain his job when a more
senior employee invokes an entitlement to it conferred by the
employer's seniority system. If for "more senior" we read "better
qualified," for "seniority system" we read "the employer's normal
method of filling vacancies," and for "superseniority" we read "a
break," US Airways becomes our case.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027
(disagreeing with an EEOC interpretation of the ADA that requires an
employer to give preference to disabled employees over more qualified non-
disabled employees).
162. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (citing the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the impact that best-qualified applicant policies have on the
duty to reassign qualified disabled workers). The Seventh Circuit's aversion
to mandatory preferences allowed the court to openly reject the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Midland Brake. See supra text accompanying note 97.
163. Anderson, supra note 6, at 35 (arguing that despite its language to the
contrary, Barnett did not end the "neutral policy defense" and that "[tihe
defense may live on in the form of a neutral policy presumption, under which
courts will simply shift the burden of proof to the employee to show it would
not be a hardship for the employer to have to violate its neutral rule").
Anderson's use of the word "may" reflects the uncertainty of the result she
predicts will flow from her normative criticism of Barnett's outcome. Many
circuits have yet to address the issue, and the Tenth Circuit most likely would
not "simply shift the burden of proof" to the employee. See supra notes 75, 83
and accompanying text (noting the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of
reassignment as requiring an active effort by the employer, regardless of a
neutral policy). Anderson conflates the means and the ends of proving an
undue hardship. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 35-36. Barnett, however,
stands for the proposition that an accommodation is unreasonable if the mere
attempt to prove undue hardship would undercut the benefits of the neutral
rule, for example, by undermining the expectations upon which the rule's
benefits depend. Infra note 172; see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14,
at 363 ("The reason why ordinarily deviations from seniority systems are not
'reasonable' is that the burden ... falls primarily not on the employer's
pocketbook, but rather on the other employees and their 'expectations of
consistent, uniform treatment... ."'). Whether the actual violation of the
neutral rule imposes a hardship on the employer is a question of undue
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result as a matter of statutory interpretation and policy.' 64
Anderson suggests that a reassignment request is reasonable,
regardless of the existence of a neutral policy, so long as it is
only a self-imposed policy and the employee is otherwise
qualified for the position. 165
Barnett, however, supplants the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning because it determined that all special
accommodations, by definition, require preferential
treatment. 66 In addition, the Barnett majority opinion does
not support Anderson's interpretation of its rule because it
limits the presumption of unreasonableness to cases where
reassignment would have a great impact on other employees.1 67
hardship. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting the distinction
between an accommodation's impact on fellow employees (unreasonable) with
an impact on the business (undue hardship)).
164. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 20. Anderson argues,
[Diespite language to the contrary in the majority opinion, Barnett
may be used to justify the degree of deference given to employers'
'neutral' policies in reassignment cases. This is unfortunate, given
that the decision is another in a line of cases from the Supreme Court
that unnecessarily alters the ADA's intended statutory scheme.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
165. Id. at 42.
166. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (outlining the Court's
rejection of the defendant's position that the ADA prohibits all forms of
preferential treatment).
167. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1522 (2002); see supra
note 125 and accompanying text (distinguishing the burdens of proving
reasonableness and undue hardship by analyzing the accommodation's impact
on employees and employers respectively). The four-Justice majority was
unequivocal:
[A] demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable
because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow
employees-say because it will lead to dismissals, relocations, or
modification of employee benefits to which an employer, looking at
the matter from the perspective of the business itself, may be
relatively indifferent.
Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1522. But see Anderson, supra note 6, at 33 (arguing
that Barnett creates a neutral policy presumption because the decision fails to
"distinguish between expectations that trump ADA rights and expectations
that must give way"). Here, Anderson conflates the meaning of "reasonable"
and the requirement that the position be "vacant." See id. at 37 ("Justice
Breyer's approach certainly stems from his concern for the interests of other
employees, but by failing to clearly connect his reasoning to a primacy of
employee contractual rights over ADA rights,... he provides no basis for
limiting the presumptive approach to seniority system cases."). If an employee
has a contractual right to the position, then the position is -not vacant. See
supra text accompanying note 139 (noting Justice O'Connor's reliance on
legally enforceable seniority rules and its relation to the statute's requirement
that the position be "vacant"). Yet, even where vacant positions exist, the
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Justice O'Connor's position does not square with the Seventh
Circuit's rule either, because she would find reassignment
reasonable if it does not breach the enforceable rights of fellow
employees. 168 Justices Souter and Ginsburg, despite dissenting
in Barnett, also directed the reasonableness inquiry to the
impact on fellow employees: A plaintiff meets his burden of
reasonableness if he shows that reassignment would not
greatly affect other employees, such as by putting them out of a
job. 169
The outcome of the reasonableness inquiry also depends on
the nature of the benefits of the neutral policy.170 A seniority
system's benefits are rooted in the expectations it creates and
fulfills. 171 In Barnett, the majority relieved the employer from
the burden of proving undue hardship for a very specific
reason: Case-by-case proof would undermine other employees'
expectations, upon which the benefits of a seniority system
depend. 172 This is not the situation with all neutral rules,
though. 173 The opinions of Justices O'Connor and Souter also
examined the nature of the benefits that a neutral policy
confers on other employees. Justice O'Connor would require
requirement that the accommodation be "reasonable" circumscribes the right
to reassignment. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at 363; supra notes 61-
63 and accompanying text.
168. Supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
169. Supra note 151 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing seniority
provisions).
171. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
172. The majority is quite clear on this point:
Most important for present purposes, to require the typical employer
to show more than the existence of a seniority system might well
undermine the employees' expectations of consistent, uniform
treatment-expectations upon which the seniority system's benefits
depend. That is because such a rule would substitute a complex case-
specific "accommodation" decision made by management for the more
uniform, impersonal operation of seniority rules. Such management
decisionmaking, with its inevitable discretionary elements, would
involve a matter of the greatest importance to employees, namely,
layoffs; it would take place outside, as well as inside, the confines of a
court case; and it might well take place fairly often.
Barnett, 122 S.Ct. at 1524-25. But see Anderson, supra note 6, at 34-37
(suggesting that the Court created a neutral policy presumption without
examining the specific benefits derived from the neutral policy).
173. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction in the operation of best-qualified applicant rules and seniority
rules).
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expectation-based benefits to be contractually enforceable,1 74
while Justice Souter would require the neutral policy's benefits
to be of the utmost importance to employees, for example, their
job security.175
Ultimately, when faced with a neutral workplace policy,
Barnett takes a two-step approach to analyze the
reasonableness of a plaintiffs accommodation. The Court first
examines who bears the adverse effects of an accommodation:
Where an accommodation's impact falls on other employees, as
opposed to the employer, the accommodation may be
unreasonable depending on the gravity of the harm.176 The
Court next examines the nature of the benefits that run to
employees from the neutral policy. Seniority's benefits, for
example, were of utmost importance to other employees and
relied on the creation and fulfillment of expectations. 177 To
force an undue hardship defense in this context, with its fact-
specific inquiry, would by its nature undermine the
expectation-based employee benefits. 178  Therefore, an
accommodation that violAtes seniority rules is unreasonable. 179
Best-qualified applicant rules, however, differ significantly
regardless of whether the best-qualified applicant is an
external applicant or a fellow employee.
B. SCENARIO ONE: DISABLED EMPLOYEE PREVAILS OVER BEST-
QUALIFIED EXTERNAL APPLICANT
When the best-qualified applicant is not a current
employee, courts should interpret the ADA to require that
employers reassign qualified disabled employees, who can no
longer perform their current job due to their disability, without
regard to the existence of a best-qualified applicant rule.
Although the trial court in Humiston-Keeling noted that the
employer's policy was limited to situations where current
employees, and not outside applicants, were being considered
for a vacant position, 180 on appeal the Seventh Circuit found
174. Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
175. Supra note 151 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting examples of
unreasonable impacts).
177. Supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (quoting the Barnett
majority's discussion of employee expectations and case-specific inquiry).
179. Supra note 131 and accompanying text.
180. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 798, 817 n.1 (mem.)
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the distinction immaterial: An employer's policy to fill
vacancies with the best-qualified applicant will always trump
the ADA's right to reassignment. 181 Barnett's interpretation of
the reasonableness of reassignment and its reliance on the
benefits of a neutral seniority system suggest otherwise. 182
The Barnett majority recognized that, by providing
consistency and predictability in management decisions,
seniority rules protect the interests of all employees and
facilitate good employee-management relations. 83 In addition,
by creating and fulfilling employee expectations of fair, uniform
treatment, seniority rules provide important employee benefits,
such as job security and "an opportunity for steady and
predictable advancement based on objective standards." 184
These considerations, which justify the presumption that
seniority rules trump the right to reassignment, are either not
present, or are sufficiently diminished, with respect to best-
qualified applicant rules and a better-qualified external
applicant.
If a disabled employee seeking reassignment is passed over
for a best-qualified external applicant, then she loses her job.185
This result can only exacerbate employee-management
relations because the contrary decision affects a non-employee.
Moreover, a decision to transfer a disabled employee, even in
the face of a more qualified outside applicant, can even improve
employee-management relations by exhibiting respect for
incumbent employees.186
(N.D. Ill. 1999), affd, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
181. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit
explained that "[a] policy of giving the job to the best applicant is legitimate
and nondiscriminatory. Decisions on the merits are not discriminatory."
Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028.
182. Supra Part V.A.
183. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (examining the Court's
reasons for exempting seniority rules).
184. Supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
185. "Reassignment often is a disabled employee's sole remaining lifeline to
avoid unemployment and, perhaps, permanent removal from the work force."
John A. Beranbaum, ADA Reasonable Accommodation of Reassignment, 9 No.
11 EMP. L. STRATEGIST 1 (2002), WL 9 No. 11 EMPLST1. This result occurs
because reassignment is the accommodation last resort, available only to
disabled workers who can no longer perform the essential functions of their
current position. Supra note 44.
186. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1088 (recognizing that
retaining incumbent employees increases morale and productivity in the
workplace (citing Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1993))).
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Passing over an external best-qualified applicant does not
disturb any legitimate expectations. An applicant for a vacant
position never had the position to begin with; therefore, job
security is not an issue.1 87 Incumbent disabled employees,
however, depend on reassignment to maintain their job
security. 88  In addition, assessing seniority ranking is
inherently objective, 189 whereas identifying a best-qualified
applicant may sometimes require subjective determinations of
an applicant's traits. 190 An employer, let alone an outside job
applicant, will not always be able to predict the best-qualified
candidate simply by resume alone-interviews matter. 191
Best-qualified hiring rules provide little predictability to
applicants.192 No anti-discrimination statute recognizes "best-
qualified" applicants as a protected class, yet Congress
expressly singled out disabled employees to receive the
187. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78
(1972) (comparing the relative interests of an employee seeking continued
employment and another seeking hire); see also Befort & Donesky, supra note
12, at 1087-88 (noting the practical advantages of reassigning the disabled
employee instead of hiring the better-qualified applicant).
188. See supra note 185 (noting that without reassignment, disabled
workers face unemployment and possibly permanent removal from the
workforce).
189. Seniority is based on the length of service with a particular employer,
an objective and easily identifiable and calculable number. Cf Cal. Brewer's
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980) ("In the area of labor relations,
'seniority' is a term that connotes length of employment .... [It] allots to
employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative
lengths of pertinent employment increase." (footnote omitted)).
190. See Murray & Murray, supra note 19, at 740 ("Unlike those seniority
policies, a 'most qualified' policy includes a necessary element of
subjectivity .... ); see also Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1173, 1176
(7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 117 (2002) (noting an employer's use of
subjectivity in selecting a best-qualified applicant); Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d
839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We also remain cognizant of the fact that the
evaluation of applicants (and applications) ... involves both objective and
subjective elements.").
191. Cf. ANDREW J. RuzICHO & Louis A. JACOBS, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
MANUAL: A GUIDE TO MINIMIZING CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
COMMON-LAW LIABILITY § 4:20, at 37 (1994) ("[Wlhat 'best qualified' really
means is open to question. Every rating involves a prediction about future job
performance. Naturally, employers prefer applicants with the higher test
results, the more enthusiastic interviewers, and the stronger track record.
These combine to yield that prediction.").
192. Cf Matheson v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 587
S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (noting that a highest scoring applicant
was lawfully denied a position, in the best interests of the department).
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protection of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. 93
Despite this, an employer's neutral workplace rule can benefit
the company in ways that render an accommodation that
violates them presumptively unreasonable. 194 Generally, this
inquiry should be individualized. 195 Exempting seniority rules
from case-by-case proof of undue hardship was necessary,
however, to avoid undermining the expectations of fellow
employees, upon which the benefits of a seniority system
depend; in that context, the Court found the reassignment
unreasonable. 196
The benefits an employer reaps from having a best-
qualified applicant rule are substantially different than the
advantages gained from a seniority system. Hiring only the
best-qualified applicants ostensibly allows an employer to
maintain the most productive and presumably efficient
workforce possible. 197 The neutral hiring criteria might also be
193. Congress's goal in enacting the ADA was to protect a disabled
employee's job security over the employer's interest in maintaining legitimate
nondiscriminatory policies that adversely affect the handicapped. See Smith
v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Thus, the ADA differs from Title VII's equal treatment model by requiring an
employer to treat its disabled applicants and employees differently. See supra
note 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Barnett majority's
interpretation of the ADA as mandating preferences through reasonable
accommodation); see also Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1082-86
(distinguishing reasonable accommodation from affirmative action). Other
scholars have thoroughly examined the practical differences between the ADA
and Title VII. E.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 15-19; Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 21 (1996).
194. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (2002)
("Excessive cost is only one of several possible bases upon which an employer
might be able to demonstrate undue hardship. Alternatively, for example, an
employer could demonstrate that the provision of a particular accommodation
would be unduly disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its
business.").
195. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001) ("[An
individualized inquiry must be made to determine whether a specific
modification for a particular person's disability would be reasonable under the
circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time
not work a fundamental alteration."); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 483 (1999) ("[Wlhether a person has a disability under the ADA is an
individualized inquiry.").
196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (quoting the Barnett
majority's discussion of employee expectations and case-specific inquiry).
197. See O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 3, at 360 (arguing that favoring less-
qualified, disabled employees essentially requires employers to lower their
standards). This may not always be the case, however. Cf. Barth v. Gelb, 2
F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (suggesting that continued retention of
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easier for the employer to administer, decreasing discretionary
decision making and potential liability. 98 These benefits,
however, do not justify a presumption that reassignment is
unreasonable if it violates the neutral hiring criteria, because
they focus on reassignment's impact on the employer. 199 The
ADA already provides a defense that considers the economic
justifications for failing to make reasonable accommodations:
undue hardship.200 This determination is made on a case-by-
case basis 20 1 and accounts for the fact that the ADA requires
employers to incur certain costs to ensure the employment of
disabled individuals rather than just cease invidious forms of
discrimination. 202
Best-qualified applicant rules operate differently than
seniority rules. The latter rely on the creation and fulfillment
of expectation to confer benefits to employees, while the former
rely on the actual implementation of the policy to confer
benefits to employers.20 3 Thus, an employer can prove that a
current employees will give employers the benefit of their "knowhow" and can
increase productivity and morale). Nothing suggests that the most qualified
worker will necessarily be the best for an employer's bottom line. Indeed,
studies have show that workers with disabilities "have a 90 percent above-
average job performance, with safety and attendance records that were far
above the norm as well." Christopher Cornell, Disabling Misconceptions, HR
EXECUTIVE MAG., Feb. 2002, at 32, http://www.business-disability.comlwhats
new/hrexec.asp (quoting Barry Honig, president of an executive recruiting
firm). Additionally, statistics show that the more subjective good qualities are
on the side of those with disabilities. See id. ("[D]isabled employees tend to be
a much more loyal workforce, and since they stay with the company longer...
knowledge and training has a higher return. In addition, many disabled
people... have had to work hard to overcome their disabilities.... [Tihey
tend to be pretty determined and intense working people.").
198. Cf. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1524-25 (2002)
(supporting its exemption for seniority rules based on potential litigation
resulting from discretionary layoffs).
199. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the Barnett
majority's focus on the impact that reassignment would have on fellow
employees in determining whether it was reasonable in the run of cases).
200. See discussion supra Part I.D.
201. See supra note 54 (noting that the undue hardship defense is analyzed
on a case-by-case basis and is fact-intensive).
202. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting the costs that anti-
discrimination statutes place on employers).
203. The benefits of a seniority system depend on the expectations of
employees that an employer will follow the system. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at
1524 (describing employee benefits in a seniority system); cf Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 229 (1982) (suggesting that violating seniority rules
causes a deterioration in "morale, labor unrest, and reduced productivity" by
destroying the expectations of other employees). The benefits of a best-
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particular reassignment is unduly costly without undermining
the benefits of the neutral rule.20 4  Reassignment in this
context is reasonable and, in the absence of case-specific proof
of undue hardship, the employer must so accommodate the
employee, regardless of a standing policy to fill vacancies with
the best-qualified candidate or the existence of a better-
qualified outside applicant. 20 5
In the context of a best-qualified applicant rule, showing
qualified applicant rule, on the other hand, depend on the realization of
actually filling vacancies with the best applicant. See O'Neil & Reiss, supra
note 3, at 360 ("Employers in most cases seek to hire not just the minimally
but the best qualified, and from management's perspective, the difference is
material and the long-term business consequences are profound."). The
impact is likewise different because one violation of a seniority system will
undercut future expectations, whereas one violation of a best-qualified
applicant rule will not prevent the realization of the policy's benefits in the
future. Compare Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524-25 (discussing employee
expectations created under a seniority system and noting that those
expectations are undermined when the system is not applied in a uniform
manner), with Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1089 (noting that when
reassigning a disabled employee over a more-qualified coworker, "the
employer only suffers a delay in benefitting from the employee's
qualifications" because "the employer likely will succeed in placing the other
well-qualified employee in the next similar vacant position").
204. See Murray & Murray, supra note 19, at 742 (stating that the ADA
requires reassignment "except when reassignment results in an undue
hardship, violates a legitimate contract right of a non-disabled employee, or a
bona fide seniority or transfer policy"); see also Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents,
983 F. Supp. 895, 903 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting that an employer should justify
its failure to reassign disabled workers under the undue hardship defense).
But see Anderson, supra note 6, at 41-43 (suggesting that Barnett does not
necessitate this result, and instead reads the word "undue" out of the statute
by forcing employees to prove the absence of hardship as part of their prima
facie case). Anderson takes issue with Justice Breyer's assumption that case-
by-case proof of undue hardship would "bring down the use of seniority
systems." Id. at 42. Granted, this issue is unlikely to arise very often. See
Ransom, 983 F. Supp. at 903 (observing that "the reassignment of two or three
disabled employees every couple of years to positions they are qualified to fill"
would be unlikely to result in a significant hardship for most employers).
When the issue happens to arise, however, the issue of reasonableness does
not depend on the impact of accommodation on employers, but rather on the
impact on fellow employees. Supra note 167 and accompanying text. Whether
the neutral rule is contractually enforceable is irrelevant if employees derive
benefits from their actual and reasonable expectations from a self-imposed
neutral policy regarding transfers. See supra note 172 and accompanying text
(quoting the Barnett majority's analysis of employee expectations under a
neutral seniority system). But see Anderson, supra note 6, at 37-42 (arguing
that the focus of inquiry should be on the employee's qualification and the
impact on the employer).
205. This is the position embraced by the Tenth Circuit, but rejected by the
Seventh Circuit. Supra notes 74-76, 161 and accompanying text.
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undue hardship is a more daunting task than it may seem.
Undue hardship is a fact-specific, individualized inquiry into
the financial impact on a business.20 6 The burden is on the
employer to prove that the costs of reassignment are too
significant and difficult to make in relation to its size.207 For
large and prosperous companies, proving a cost-based undue
hardship to a jury may not be easy. 208  Moreover, job
performance in certain occupations may be unaffected by slight
differences in qualifications, so long as the employee is
qualified.20 9 Forcing the employer to prove an undue hardship
will also allow the plaintiff-employee to question the legitimacy
of the neutral policy by showing that the difference in
qualifications is not significant to job performance in the
particular position, or perhaps that the policy is not
consistently implemented.210
206. See supra note 56-60, 124 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
208. Cf Ransom, 983 F. Supp. at 903 (noting that the impact of
reassignment will be a minimal hardship on employers). Employers retain the
ability to establish the minimum qualifications of a position, to which courts
will grant deference. See Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n)
(2002) ("It is important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not
intended to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard to
production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require
employers to lower such standards."). In addition, future adverse impacts
would have to be tempered by possible positive impacts. See supra note 197
and accompanying text (discussing the benefit of retaining disabled
employees). Finally, after reassignment, the disabled worker's former
position, an equivalent or better position, see supra note 46 (observing that the
vacant position should be equal or lesser in status, but never a promotion),
becomes vacant and would be available to the non-assigned applicant.
209. Cf. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d
13, 24 (1st Cir. 1998) (considering candidates who scored within a three-point
band as functionally equivalent and equally qualified to successfully perform
the job as any other person in that score band).
210. See O'Neil & Reiss, supra note 3, at 360 ("[Ulnder a more principled
reading of the ADA, disabled employees would be entitled to a reassignment
unless the employer can show that it selected a more qualified applicant or
otherwise took action consistent with the legitimate expectations of other
workers."). In addition, the cost to the employer will differ dramatically
depending on whether the disabled employee is the second most qualified
applicant, as opposed to the most minimally qualified applicant; this analysis
requires an individualized inquiry. Cf Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 979 F.2d 721, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[M]inor differences in test
scores do not reliably predict differences in job performance .... The smaller
the difference between observed scores, the more likely it is a result of
measurement error, and not a variance in job-related skills and abilities.").
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C. SCENARIO Two: DISABLED EMPLOYEE PREVAILS OVER BEST-
QUALIFIED COWORKER
A closer case is presented if the best-qualified applicant is
another employee, but the statutory directive and Barnett's
interpretations of reasonable accommodation still suggest that
an employer must reassign a qualified disabled employee to a
vacant position, even if she is not the best-qualified. 211 In its
Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC answers the question on
point: Qualified disabled employees have a right to
reassignment and do not have to be the most qualified person
seeking the vacant position. 212 Seven Justices are likely to
agree.
The four-Justice majority looked to analogous case law
under Title VII and the creation and fulfillment of employee
expectations to show that reassignment is unreasonable if it
conflicts with a neutral seniority policy.213 Title VII recognizes
the importance of seniority systems to employee-management
relations, but does not apply to the ADA and a case involving a
policy to fill vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. 214
Unlike Title VII, the ADA contains no provision offering
explicit protection of seniority systems 21 5 and affirmatively
requires reasonable accommodation of disabled employees. 216
211. Cf. Befort & Donesky, supra note 12, at 1088-90 (arguing, prior to
Barnett, that courts should favor the reassignment claim of a disabled
employee versus a better-qualified employee).
212. Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 127-30 (discussing the Court's analysis of
reassignment versus seniority systems).
214. While the two statutes share similarities, ADA causes of action
involve unique considerations not present in Title VII claims. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 6, at 15-19 (observing that courts have often conflated
ADA and Title VII claims, despite distinct statutory provisions); Malloy, supra
note 3, at 618-60 (identifying the differences between the ADA and Title VII,
notably the requirement of reasonable accommodation and allocation of
burdens of proof).
215. See supra note 149 (discussing Justice Souter's critique of the Court's
reliance on Title VII).
216. Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate their
employees' religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 (2000) (excluding
application to religious organizations and defining religion as "all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business"). With respect to equality
of employment opportunities, religious accommodation is not as significant as
disability accommodation, because disability will affect an employee's ability
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More saliently, the ADA does not protect the rights of all people
regardless of ability or disability, whereas Title VII protects all
races, sexes, national origins, and religions.217  Even so,
Supreme Court precedent interpreting Title VII is
unambiguous: A better-qualified employee "had no absolute
entitlement to the ... position .... [Dienial of the promotion
unsettled no legitimate, firmly rooted expectation .... ",218
Thus, to the extent that Title VII is relevant, it does not
insulate best-qualified hiring policies.219
Violating a best-qualified applicant rule would likely
disturb employee-management relations less than violating a
seniority system would.220 Vying employees for a vacant
to do the job more frequently than an employee's religious practices. Cf H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350
(arguing that the ADA's duty to accommodate is stronger than Title VII's
because "of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring
meaningful employment opportunities for people with disabilities").
217. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(preventing discrimination against otherwise qualified disabled employees or
applicants), with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, id. § 2000e-2
(preventing employment discrimination because of any race, sex, religion, or
national origin). Reverse discrimination lawsuits are not available under the
ADA. See, e.g., Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 193, at 3-4. Similarly, the
Constitution demands only the lowest level of scrutiny of disability-related
distinctions, as opposed to the higher level of scrutiny for distinctions based on
race or religion. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at 367-69; see also
Leading Cases, supra note 14, at 347-52 (critiquing Barnett's reliance on
strained analogies to Title VII without an explanation of its appropriateness,
"a critical component of reasoning by analogy").
218. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987). Interestingly,
the Court also noted the lack of adverse impact on the employee because "he
retained his employment with the Agency, at the same salary and with the
same seniority, and remained eligible for other promotions." Id.; cf Befort &
Donesky, supra note 12, at 1088-90 (discussing the relative impacts of denying
transfer to a vacant position on a disabled employee versus a better-qualified
employee and using the impact to justify the disabled individual's right to
reassignment).
219. See, e.g., Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("Title VII liability cannot rest solely upon a judge's determination
that an employer misjudged the relative qualifications of admittedly qualified
candidates.").
220. Seniority violations affect all current employees by undermining
expectations that the system will be followed, whereas best-qualified applicant
violations affect only the best-qualified candidate because no other applicant
would have gotten the position under the policy. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
122 S.Ct. 1516, 1524 (2002). This difference is crucial in assessing whether
the accommodation is presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 1524-25 (noting the
Court's reliance on the importance of employee expectations in holding that




position will often be unaware of the qualifications of
competing applicants and of the employer's perception of such
qualifications. 221 The same set of employees, however, will
most likely be aware of each other's relative seniority ranking
since it is far easier to discover and compare length of
service. 222
Moreover, the Barnett majority's concern for job security
and predictability in employment decisions223 does not render
reassignment unreasonable in the context of best-qualified
applicant rules. A typical employee will likely have less
expectation and reliance on being transferred into a position
before it becomes vacant pursuant to a best-qualified hiring
policy because that status is not easily predictable. 224
Therefore, since the benefits of a best-qualified hiring rule do
not rely on expectations, a case-by-case determination to violate
this type of neutral policy under an undue hardship analysis is
proper.225
A disabled employee generally has less security in his or
her job than an able-bodied counterpart. 226 This is especially
221. Cf. Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 602-03 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting that "[an employee's perception of his own performance...
cannot tell a reasonable factfinder something about what the employer
believed about the employee's abilities").
222. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (observing that employees'
perception of their own or others' qualifications have no bearing on what the
employer believes); see also supra note 191 and accompanying text (noting the
difficulty in identifying the best-qualified applicant due to the multiple
subjective factors that an employer assesses in the hiring process); cf
Matheson v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm., 587 S.W.2d 795, 797
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that a highest scoring applicant was lawfully
denied a promotion, in the best interests of the department). Even after the
position is vacant, the effects of losing transfer versus undermining a seniority
system are hardly comparable. See supra note 125 (listing the types of
consequences on fellow employees, such as dismissals, relocations, or lost
benefits, that make a reassignment unreasonable); supra note 218 and
accompanying text (illustrating the lack of impact on an employee who is not
given a transfer, since he remains in the same position as before, with the
same pay and seniority).
225. See supra notes 172, 196-205 and accompanying text.
226. See Suzanne Robitaille, For the Disabled, It's Always a Depression,
Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2001, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/dec2001/nf2001125_8727.htm (quoting Ed Yelin, professor at the
University of California at Berkeley). The disabled are the first to be
displaced in bad times, and a weak job market makes it more difficult for
disabled workers to enter the workforce. See id. "[T]wo out of three disabled
people capable of working are unemployed .... Id. (citing U.S. Census
2003] 2099
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true in the reassignment context because the disabled
employee is faced with transfer or firing.227 A fellow employee
maintains job security with or without transfer.228 Thus, to the
extent that job security is an important employee benefit
influencing whether accommodation is reasonable, it cuts in
favor of the disabled worker's right to reassignment.
The Barnett majority focused on the benefits a neutral
seniority system confers on employees to find a reassignment in
violation of the system unreasonable. 229 With the case of a
best-qualified applicant rule, however, the primary concern is
the benefit to the employer. 230 Furthermore, the benefits of a
policy that fills vacancies with the best-qualified candidate do
not depend on employees' expectation that the policy will be
followed. 231 This suggests that reassignment in violation of this
type of rule will be reasonable in the run of cases,232 leaving the
Bureau data). But see Nat'l Org. on Disability, Employment Rates for People
with Disabilities, at http://www.nod.org/cont/dspcontitemview.cfm?
contentId=134 (July 24, 2001) (indicating that the employment rate for people
with disabilities who say they are able to work has increased ten percent from
1986 to 2000). The explanation for this fact is hardly elusive. Negative
stereotypes combine with the legitimate economic concerns of employers, see
Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at 368, leaving the disabled as the
demographic group with the highest unemployment rate in the country. See
Robitaille, supra; see also Ctr. for an Accessible Soc'y, Labor Day, 2002:
Unemployment Rate for People with Disabilities More than 40 Percent, Census
Data Shows, at http://www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/economics-employment
/labor2002.html (last visited March 23, 2003) (suggesting that the twenty-one
percent employment differential between able-bodied and disabled Americans
was due to "[aidverse court rulings and contradictory federal policies that
actually make it difficult for people with disabilities to work").
227. See supra notes 44, 185 and accompanying text (observing that,
without reassignment, a disabled worker will typically be fired).
228. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme
Court's practical weighing of this scenario in Johnson); see also Befort &
Donesky, supra note 12, at 1089 (observing that the consequences suffered by
a more qualified employee who does not obtain a desired transfer are
minimized because they retain their current position and qualifications,
making them strong candidates for future transfers or promotions).
229. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1522 (2002). "[A]
demand for effective accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its
impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees-say because it
will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee benefits to
which an employer ... may be relatively indifferent." Id.
230. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (observing that the
primary benefit of hiring the most qualified worker is increased productivity
and efficiency).
231. See supra note 203.
232. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 119-
30 and accompanying text (noting that the impact of reassignment on other
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employer to prove undue hardship as a cost-based defense. 233
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the reassignment
provision makes the impact of neutral employer policies on the
reasonableness of reassignment depend on the legal
enforceability of the policies and their effect on a position's
vacancy.234 An applicant cannot claim a legal entitlement to a
vacant position based on the employer's bona fide policy of
assigning the best-qualified applicant.235  This is true
regardless of whether the applicant is an employee seeking
transfer or an outsider seeking a job. 236 Neither applicant has
a contractual agreement with the employer that confers an
enforceable right to the vacant position. 237
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's reliance on the "vacant"
requirement offers affirmative support for the right to
reassignment despite an employer's consistently implemented
policy to fill vacancies with the best-qualified applicant. By
constructing the term "discriminate" to include the failure to
reasonably accommodate qualified disabled individuals, 238 the
ADA creates a duty to accommodate, in turn giving the
disabled individual a right to reasonable accommodation. 239 If
reassignment is the only possible accommodation that will
enable a qualified disabled worker to remain employed, then
the ADA creates a legal entitlement to the position. 240 When a
employees was crucial to the Court finding the accommodation unreasonable).
233. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (quoting the Supreme
Court's belief that better qualifications grant no legal entitlements).
236. Cf Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corrs., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("Even if a court suspects that a job applicant 'was victimized by a poor
selection procedures' it may not 'second-guess an employer's personnel
decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.'. . . [Tihe court must
respect the employer's unfettered discretion to choose among qualified
candidates." (citation omitted)).
237. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1527 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
239. Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WiS. L. REV. 975, 986-87
(explaining the concept of "jural correlatives" as expressing a single legal
relation from the point of view of two parties, and identifying "right" as the
correlative of "duty").
240. Provided, of course, that the other requirements are met: the disabled
individual is a current employee and is qualified for the position, the position
is vacant and is equivalent (or lesser) to the individual's former job, and all
other avenues of accommodation have failed. See discussion supra Part I.C.
210120031
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qualified disabled employee requests reassignment, subject to a
determination of its appropriateness, she becomes the
possessor of that position. 241 The employer's neutral policy of
filling vacancies with the best-qualified applicant is not
implicated because the position has ceased to be vacant.
Justice Scalia's dissent supplies the biggest impediment to
uniformity of reassignment decisions in the lower courts and
amongst employers. 242  The ADA defines unlawful
discrimination as including the failure to make reasonable
accommodations "to the known physical or mental limitations"
of qualified disabled employees. 243  Justice Scalia's
interpretation gives the preposition "to" overriding significance
when assessing best-qualified applicant rules.244  Hence,
Justice Scalia would not find liability where better-qualified
applicant rules exist because the lower qualifications of a
disabled employee have nothing to do with his disability.245
This argument is flawed because it ignores the preceding
prohibitive phrase: "Not making reasonable accom-
modations."246 The accommodation in question is not changing
the hiring rules; the requested accommodation is
reassignment. 247  The barrier is the current job. 248
The legal entitlement is subject to the employer's affirmative defense of undue
hardship. See discussion supra Part I.D.
241. The disabled worker has a right in fact to the transfer if it is
reasonable. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
242. Only this opinion explicitly mentions the neutral workplace policy of
filling vacant positions with the best-qualified applicant, and it does so in a
way that clearly limits the disabled employee's right to reassignment. See
supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (noting that a disabled employee
only has a right to reassignment where there are no obstacles to the
appointment, such as seniority systems or a better qualified candidate).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
244. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (explaining Justice
Scalia's argument that the ADA imposes liability only if an employer fails to
remove those barriers that would not be barriers but for the disability of the
employee).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (constructing the term discriminate to
include "not making reasonable accommodation to the known physical or
mental limitations").
247. Justice Scalia misconstrues the accommodation in question to be
modifying the neutral hiring policy that fills vacancies with the best-qualified
applicant. Thus, because the requested accommodation must "arise from" the
disability, see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1529 (2002)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), the ADA's reassignment provision cannot violate best-
qualified applicant hiring policies. A disabled employee is requesting
2102
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Accommodation can only remove the barrier to employment
(the current job) by providing an alternate job (through
reassignment) for the disabled employee. 249  Thus, if
reassignment does not cause an undue hardship, the employer
must do more than merely consider the transfer because failing
to make reasonable accommodations is an act of
discrimination. 250
Justice Souter's position recognizes that the ADA does not
create any special exemption for consistently implemented,
non-discriminatory employer policies. 25' Justice Souter
believes that if a plaintiff shows that reassignment is
"plausible" or "feasible," then she has proven the
accommodation is reasonable. 252 Thus, he would reject the
reassignment to a vacant position, however, because his disability prevents
him from performing his current job with or without reasonable
accommodation. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Thus, if this
accommodation is both effective and reasonable, then the ADA requires an
employer to either transfer the individual or prove the existence of an undue
hardship. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's interpretation of the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" mandate).
248. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (highlighting Justice
Scalia'a recognition that reassignment seeks to eliminate the obstacle of the
current job).
249. This interpretation also satisfies Justice Scalia's demand that the
barrier arise from the disability because the failure 'to be able to perform the
essential functions of the current job are due to the worker's disability. See
supra notes 70-71, 88-93, 110-11 and accompanying text (highlighting the
facts of Midland Brake, Humiston-Keeling, and Barnett, where all three
plaintiffs sought reassignment because their disability prevented them from
performing their original job).
250. See supra Part I.A-B (relating the ADA's general prohibition of
discrimination and its requirement of reasonable accommodations); cf. Smith
v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting
the consideration of reassignment is not the extent of an employer's duty to
transfer). Likewise, it would not be sufficient for an employer to consider
modifying a workstation and not actually modify it. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at
1521. Justice Scalia argues that this situation is different because the
obstacles arise from the disability. See id. at 1531 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia does not acknowledge the barrier in the case of reassignment
which arises from the disability because the disability prevents performance of
the original position, creating a need to be transferred to remain employed;
removing the barrier through reasonable accommodation requires
reassignment to a vacant position. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 14, at
365; see also supra note 249 (noting the disabled employees' motivation for
seeking reassignment in Midland Brake, Humiston-Keeling, and Barnett).
251. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text; see also Anderson,
supra note 6, at 41-43 (suggesting that, as a matter of policy and statutory
interpretation, this is the correct outcome).
252. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1534 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Barnett,
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Seventh Circuit's requirement that reassignment be both
feasible and not require the employer to turn away a superior
applicant. 253 His standard also suggests that the Tenth Circuit
was incorrect to require an employer's nondiscriminatory policy
vitiate the statutory obligation before a disabled worker's right
to reassignment prevailed.254  As a threshold inquiry,
regardless of nondiscriminatory employer policies, disabled
employees seeking reassignment must merely show that the
accommodation is reasonable. 255 Barnett's reassignment was
reasonable because he showed that it would not cause any
unmanageable ripple effect nor overstep an inordinate number
of seniority levels. 256
With respect to best-qualified applicant rules, Justice
Souter's analysis cuts more strongly in favor of the disabled
employee. Ripple effects will be less pronounced than those
resulting from violating a seniority system.257 A snubbed
applicant may not even be an employee of the company. This is
rarely the case with seniority systems.258 In addition, a best-
qualified applicant policy is of less importance to fellow
employees than a seniority system because the latter affects
everyone, and often implicates decisions of fundamental
122 S. Ct. at 1523).
253. See supra note 161 (quoting the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
Barnett's rule, as applied to best-qualified hiring rules).
254. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. Some have argued,
rather persuasively, that best-qualified applicant rules would not vitiate the
right to reassignment since the provision would obligate the transfer of a non-
performing disabled employee who happens to be the best-qualified applicant
for the vacant position, where the employer could simply fire a non-disabled,
non-performing employee. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1529-30 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Anderson, supra note 6, at 37-40 (arguing that the Tenth
Circuit's standard is too narrow).
255. See supra notes 39, 81, 123 and accompanying text.
256. See Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1534 (Souter, J., dissenting). The fact that
the seniority system was modifiable at-will and non-binding showed that
Barnett's reassignment would not "have resulted in anything more than a
minimal disruption to U.S. Airways's operations." Id.
257. See supra notes 203, 220-22 and accompanying text (distinguishing
the impact of violating seniority rules from the impact of violating best-
qualified hiring rules).
258. Since seniority starts to accrue after hire, violations that undermine
the system's stability affect every employee of the company. Cf. Cal. Brewer's
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980) ("In the area of labor relations,
'seniority' is a term that connotes length of employment .... [It] allots to
employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative
lengths of pertinent employment increase.").
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importance to employees, namely layoffs and firings, 259 whereas
a transfer denial only affects those seeking to switch jobs.260
An individualized decision to bypass a policy to fill
vacancies with the best-qualified applicant also oversteps fewer
rights of fellow employees. 261 At most, any given violation of
this neutral policy will allow a disabled employee to overstep
just one fellow employee since there can be only one best-
qualified applicant. 262 Thus, even though Justices Souter and
Ginsburg dissented from the majority in Barnett, they would
most likely join the majority in finding reassignment to be
reasonable even if it violates an employer's nondiscriminatory
policy to fill vacancies with the best-qualified applicant.
CONCLUSION
The opinions of a majority of Justices in Barnett sanction
mandatory preferences for qualified disabled employees who
are eligible for reassignment. Irrespective of a bona fide policy
to hire the best-qualified applicant, employers cannot avoid the
ADA's mandate of reasonable accommodation without proving
that the accommodation, in the specific instance, would impose
an undue hardship on the business. Seven Justices support the
proposition that a presumption of unreasonableness does not
arise merely from the existence of a neutral policy; the nature
of the policy's benefits to fellow employees, and whether those
benefits are inextricably linked to expectations that the policy
will be consistently followed, determines whether a proposed
accommodation is presumptively unreasonable. Unlike the
case of seniority rules, it is possible to conduct an
individualized inquiry into undue hardship without upsetting
259. See supra note 172. As explained above, these decisions and policies
are also likely to be less visible and, due to their subjectivity, are less easily
calculable, which would result in less of a ripple effect from their violation.
See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
260. Even then, the worst-case scenario is not firing, but rather remaining
in the current position. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
261. In fact, the decision oversteps no rights of fellow employees. See supra
notes 218-19 (observing that best-qualified applicants have no enforceable
right to be hired).
262. Of course, there may be situations where qualifications are equal, but
even then an employer retains discretion to select just one of them. Cf. Simms
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.
1999) ("When two candidates are equally qualified.., and neither is clearly
better qualified, 'it is within the employer's discretion to choose among them
so long as the decision is not based on unlawful criteria."' (citation omitted)).
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the purpose of best-qualified hiring rules. Similarly, the rare
contravention of the policy will not hopelessly undermine its
benefits to the employer. Either way, that issue would be for
the employer to prove under the defense of undue hardship.
Regardless of whether the best-qualified candidate for a
vacant position is an external applicant or internal coworker
seeking transfer, a qualified disabled employee's claim for
reassignment should prevail. The ADA's text supports the
inviolability of the obligation to reasonably accommodate
qualified disabled individuals. The ADA seeks to ensure the
productivity and self-sufficiency of disabled individuals. That
goal depends largely on reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation because reassignment offers the last option for
a disabled worker to remain employed. To properly fulfill this
function of reassignment, courts must require that an employer
reassign a qualified disabled worker, even if he is not deemed
the best-qualified candidate for the vacancy.
